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On October 27, 2020 Japanese Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide announced that his ad-
ministration would set national policy on course to aim at net‐zero in greenhouse gas （GHG） 
emissions by 2050. Japan is now one of over 100 countries committed to achieving net‐zero 
by 2050.2 ） Japan’s decarbonization pledge is backed up by ambitions for a vast rollout of off-
shore wind, millions of tonnes of “green hydrogen,” and assertions that domestic automakers 
can achieve net‐zero emissions from the entire life cycle3 ） of a vehicle.4 ）
Japan’s commitment was strongly welcomed by an international climate‐policy com-
munity shocked by the impact of the COVID‐19 pandemic and seeking roadmaps for build-
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1 ）This article is a revised version of “Japan’s Green Tech Plans Face Critical Raw Material Is-
sues,” in Japan NRG Weekly, January 18, 2021: http://www.yuri‐invest‐research.com/newsletter 
2 ）See “What Do Countries Need to Do to Reach Net‐Zero Emissions?,” Earth.org, February 9 , 
2021: https://earth.org/reaching‐net‐zero‐emissions/
3 ）Meaning manufacture, use, and then end‐use.
4 ）On this, see （in Japanese） “Carmakers also aim for decarbonization by 2050 ,” Nikkei Shimbun, 
December 17, 2020: https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXZQOFD175MG 0 X11C20A2000000
Abstract
Japanese public policy aims at net‐zero in greenhouse gas （GHG） emissions by 2050. 
Japan’s decarbonization pledge is backed up by ambitious plans for offshore wind, “green hy-
drogen,” and electric vehicles. This paper asks whether resource‐scarce Japan has sufficient 
access to critical raw materials to undertake decarbonization. It also asks whether Japan has a 
credible strategy to secure critical raw materials that conform to emerging sustainability rules.
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ing back better on all fronts.5 ） Perhaps Japan possesses the innovative capacity to realize its 
decarbonization goals. But one pressing question is whether resource‐scarce Japan has suffi-
cient access to the voluminous critical raw materials required to pursue its emergent plan 
for decarbonization. Equally important is asking whether Japan has a robust strategy to se-
cure critical raw materials that also conform to rapidly strengthening sustainability rules.
It’s a material world
The imperative of rapid decarbonization is a global consensus. But it is important to 
note that no country’s net‐zero commitments are backed up by detailed and credible plan-
ning. Even the much‐lauded EU goals for a green recovery and decarbonization by 2050 lack 
clarity. The EU goals remain largely a vision rather than a roadmap. The hard work of land‐
use changes, lifestyle shifts, the relative proportion of decarbonizing energy technologies, and 
other fundamental issues remain to be decided. Yet what is clear is that decarbonization will 
require a lot of new mining for copper, cobalt, lithium, and other critical raw materials （also 
referred to as “critical minerals” and “critical and strategic minerals”6 ） ）． These materials 
are used in especially high densities in variable renewable energy （VRE） and electrified mo-
bility, especially electric vehicles （EVs）．
Specialists have debated for several years whether there are adequate supplies of crit-
ical raw materials to meet the projected demand for significantly increased renewable ener-
gy, let alone scenarios of global decarbonization.7 ） But concerns about decarbonization’s ma-
terial demand went mainstream at the start of 2021. On January 11, 2021, the International 
Energy Agency （IEA） announced a series of special projects for 2021, leading up to the May 
18 release of The World’s Roadmap to Net Zero by 2050.8 ） Key among the IEA special re-
5 ）One example is Japan NRG founder Yuriy Humber’s article “There are good reasons to cele-
brate Japan’s decarbonization pledge,” Nikkei Asia, December 12, 2020: https://asia.nikkei.com/Opin 
ion/There‐are‐good‐reasons‐to‐celebrate‐Japan‐s‐decarbonization‐pledge 
6 ）Other terms include “green energy metals,” “energy transition metals,” “battery metals,” and the 
like. These terms generally delineat subset groups of minerals and metals used in renewable ener-
gy, battery storage, and more specific applications.
7 ）One example of the debate is seen in Peter Viebahn, et al., “Assessing the need for critical min-
erals to shift the German energy system towards a high proportion of renewables,” Renewable and 
Sustainable Energy Reviews, Vol. 49, September 2015: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/arti 
cle/pii/S1364032115003408
8 ）The IEA announcement is summarized at “IEA to produce world’s first comprehensive road-
map to net‐zero emissions by 2050,” International Energy Agency, January 11, 2021: https://www.
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ports will be what IEA director Fatih Birol correctly described as the first comprehensive 
and global study of the supply constraints, lifecycle costs, environmental justice, and related 
challenges confronting the critical minerals used in electric vehicles, renewable energy equip-
ment, and the myriad other elements of the clean energy transition. This IEA special report 
is to be titled The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions, and is slated for 
publication in April.
In IEA director Birol’s January 11 press conference, he pointed to lithium, nickel, co-
balt and rare earths as among the critical minerals under the IEA’s review. 9 ） That brief 
itemization is not exhaustive. What constitutes a “critical raw material” （CRM） – to use the 
European Commission’s abbreviation ‐ varies by country and is based on each jurisdiction’s 
assessment of dozens of materials’ specific domestic economic importance, supply risk and 
related factors. China’s most recent CRM list, which is not publicly available,10） dates back to 
2016 and delineates 24 “strategic minerals.”11） This number is the same as Australia’s list, 
though the two lists differ greatly in composition and purpose.12） As of 2018, the U.S. identi-
fies 35 CRMs.13） This number is the same as South Korea’s list of 35 CRMs, though their spe-
cific content varies.14） And Japan’s CRM list comprises 34 materials,15） up from 30 in 2012.16）
iea.org/news/iea‐to‐produce‐world‐s‐first‐comprehensive‐roadmap‐to‐net‐zero‐emissions‐by‐
2050 
9 ）The IEA press conference, titled “IEA key priorities and special projects for 2021,” is available 
at the following URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZZNEFn 5 UfrQ 
10）See Na Zhou, et al., “Synthesized indicator for evaluating security of strategic minerals in China: 
A case study of lithium,” Resources Policy, Vol. 69, December 2020: https://www.sciencedirect.com/
science/article/pii/S0301420720309466
11）See Patrick Andersson, “Chinese assessments of ‘critical’ and ‘strategic’ raw materials: Concepts, 
categories, policies, and implications,” The Extractive Industries and Society, Volume 7 / 1 , January 
2020: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S2214790X19303454#! 
12）Australia’s critical minerals list reflects its resource endowments as much as assessments of do-
mestic needs and supply risk. See Jack Bedder and Jack Anderson, “Critical materials: Australia re-
leases updated critical minerals list,” Roskill Industry News, November 6 , 2020: https://roskill.com/
news/critical‐materials‐australia‐releases‐updated‐critical‐minerals‐list/ 
13）See “Final List of Critical Minerals 2018,” US Federal Register, May 18, 2018: https://www.feder 
alregister.gov/documents/2018/05/18/2018‐10667/final‐list‐of‐critical‐minerals‐2018  
14）See Kyounga Lee and Jongmun Cha, “Towards Improved Circular Economy and Resource Secu-
rity in South Korea,” Sustainability, Vol. 13, December 2020: https://ideas.repec.org/a/gam/jsusta/
v13y2020i 1 p17‐d466540.html
15）See p. 47 in （in Japanese） “Arguments relevant to deciding the new international resource strat-
egy,” October 4 , 2019 : https://www.meti.go.jp/shingikai/enecho/shigen_nenryo/sekiyu_gas/
pdf/010_03_00.pdf 
16）Japan’s 2012 list is summarized on p. 23 of （in Japanese） “Outline of the Strategy for Resource 
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For their part, India’s specialists often use “new‐age metals,” “Technology Metals and 
Energy‐Critical Metals,” and “Energy Critical Elements” to delineate CRM critical raw mate-
rials.17） India’s first study of critical minerals was undertaken in 2016. It assessed 49 non‐fuel 
minerals, and determined that 12 confronted serious supply constraints by 2030.18） India’s list 
is virtually certain to increase, in line with those of Japan, the EU, and other examples. The 
same is true of Germany’s raw materials strategy, which is surprisingly limited in spite of 
the country’s lofty ambitions for VRE, EVs and other elements of decarbonization.19）
Interestingly, what is deemed a critical resource has largely evolved and expanded in 
line with the expansion of digital technology, clean energy and decarbonization goals.20） The 
EU is a notable example of this phenomenon. Its first triennial review of CRMs identified 14 
materials in 2011, and the second review in 2014 expanded that to 20 CRMs. As investments 
in renewable energy and other green tech sectors have soared, the EU’s CRM list has bal-
looned. By 2017, it contained 27 materials. As of September 2020, the number had grown to 
30.21）
Another factor that drives CRM lists is technological innovation. Increasingly sophisti-
cated devices – whether in consumer electronics, renewable energy, or military hardware – 
require ever more types of CRM. Hence, for example, the “fabrication of high‐speed, high‐ca-
pacity integrated circuits required only 12 minerals in the 1980s but more than 60 by the 
2000s. Building a modern cell phone now requires materials containing 75 minerals, compris-
Security,” Materials presented to cabinet member meeting on promotion of package‐style infra-
structure exports, June 27, 2012: http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/package/dai15/gijisidai.html 
17）One example is seen in S. Vijay Kumar, “We Need to Mine in India to Make in India,”Presentation 
to India Mining Summit 2018, July, 2018: https://www.teriin.org/sites/default/files/2018‐08/mining‐
recommendation‐paper.pdf
18）See Vaibhav Gupta, et al., “Critical Non‐Fuel Mineral Resources for India’s Manufacturing Sector: 
A Vision for 2030,” Council on Energy, Environment and Water, July 2016: https://www.ceew.in/
publications/critical‐non‐fuel‐mineral‐resources‐india’s‐manufacturing‐sector
19）On Germany’s strategy, see Marc Schmid, “The Revised German Raw Materials Strategy in the 
Light of Global Political and Market Developments,” Review of Policy Research, January 6 , 2021: 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/ropr.12408
20）See Jack Anderson, “Critical materials: EU releases updated critical raw materials list,” Roskill 
Industry News, September 4 , 2020: https://roskill.com/news/critical‐materials‐eu‐releases‐updat 
ed‐critical‐raw‐materials‐list/ 
21）The EU list separates the rare earths into two categories of heavy and light elements. On the EU 
list and its evolution, see “Critical raw materials,” European Commission, nd: https://ec.europa.eu/
growth/sectors/raw‐materials/specific‐interest/critical_en 
Decarbonization and Critical Raw Materials: Some Issues for Japan 5
ing elements covering about two thirds of the periodic table.”22） And as the required number 
of CRMs increase in these devices, the market for the devices is increasingly global.
At present, all publicly available national lists include the 17 rare earth metals, gener-
ally grouping them as a single item, reflecting their outsized importance relative to their 
small quantities.23） In 2019, global mined production of rare earths was just 210,000 tons with 
a market value of about USD 8  billion. That latter figure belies their importance, as rare 
earths were essential to many multiples of that value in VRE, EVs, electronics, and other ap-
plications.24）
While most CRM lists converge on rare earths, cobalt, graphite, indium, and lithium, 
the view on other materials differs. For example, Japan has long determined copper to be 
critical, whereas the EU, US, and other countries do not. Yet the global assessments of cop-
per appear to be rapidly moving towards Japan’s position. One reason is that copper is used 
in more applications, in addition to clean energy, than any other CRM.25） Copper is also the 
“gateway” to many other CRMs because they are byproducts of copper production.26） At the 
same time, ramping up copper mining is fraught with environmental impacts, governance 
challenges, human rights implications, and other issues. Thus, copper is increasingly central 
to assessments of critical raw materials.27） Many experts and analysts are re‐evaluating cop-
per’s core contribution in the renewables space and – as Wood Mackenzie does – ranking it 
22）See Paul Emsbo, et al., “Geological Surveys Unite to Improve Critical Mineral Security,” EOS 
News, February 5 , 2021 : https://eos.org/science‐updates/geological‐surveys‐unite‐to‐improve‐
critical‐mineral‐security
23）A summary of the rare earth elements can be found at “Rare earth elements facts,” Natural Re-
sources Canada, November 27, 2019: https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/science‐data/science‐research/earth
‐sciences/earth‐sciences‐resources/earth‐sciences‐federal‐programs/rare‐earth‐elements‐
facts/20522 
24）The global data on rare earths are summarized in “Mineral Commodity Summaries, 2020” United 
States Geological Survey, January 31, 2020: https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2020/mcs2020.pdf 
25）One good visual portrayal of copper’s role – too detailed for reproduction in the present paper ‐ 
is available on the title page of “Critical materials for strategic technologies and sectors in the EU ‐ 
a foresight study, 2020 ," European Commission: https://rmis.jrc.ec.europa.eu/uploads/CRMs_for_
Strategic_Technologies_and_Sectors_in_the_EU_2020.pdf 
26）For this reason, many American experts argued their own country’s CRM list should include cop-
per. See Veronica Tuazon, “’Critical Minerals’ list snubs copper, sparks discussion of criticality,” 
Earth Magazine, December 20, 2018: https://www.earthmagazine.org/article/critical‐minerals‐list‐
snubs‐copper‐sparks‐discussion‐criticality 
27）See Dieuwertje Schrivers, et al., “A review of methods and data to determine raw material criti-
cality,” Resources, Conservation and Recycling, Vol. 155, April 2020: https://www.sciencedirect.com/
science/article/pii/S0921344919305233
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alongside aluminum, nickel, cobalt and lithium as an “energy transition metal.”28）
Driving concerns
As alluded to in the above, there are several drivers for this deepening convergence 
of concern regarding CRMs. One is the rapidly increasing global commitment to “green deal,” 
“green recovery,” and similarly named transformative policies. These GHG‐reduction policies 
predate COVID‐19 . But during the pandemic, a consensus emerged to “build back better” 
from the ravages of COVID‐19 and cope with climate change. 
These GHG‐reduction initiatives are also imperative lest China’s GHG‐intensive recov-
ery from COVID‐19 become the norm for much of the planet. The authoritative Carbon 
Monitor’s January 22, 2021 calculations show that China’s emissions from January 1 , 2020 to 
December 31, 2021 exceeded the previous year’s total by 0.5%. During the same period, total 
global emissions declined by 4.4%, dropping 8.1% in India, 5.0% in Japan, 12.5% in the US, and 
7.5% in the EU 28.29）
However, decarbonized power, housing, mobility, communications, and other industries 
are not built with intangible technologies and innovation. Greening requires prodigious 
amounts of very tangible CRMs whose environmental costs and geopolitical implications are 
increasingly huge. To be sure, the CRMs used in decarbonizing green technologies are a dra-
matically different mix of materials than the fossil‐fuels that distinguish the grey, or carbon‐
intensive economy and society. Put simply, solar panels and wind farms – the poster kids of 
green – do not burn any of the 7  billions tonnes of thermal coal forecast to be produced in 
2020.30） But on the other hand, the CRM‐intensity of green technology is impressive. Hence, 
the more solar, wind and battery storage there is in the decarbonizing power mix, the higher 
the CRM intensity of installed generating capacity and the CRM intensity of generated pow-
er.
For example, as seen in figure 1 , data from a March 2020 IEA report indicate that 
28）See Simon Flowers, “The energy transition will be built with metals: Getting to grips with supply 
of the Big 5 ,” Wood Mackenzie, October 30, 2020: https://www.woodmac.com/news/the‐edge/the‐
energy‐transition‐will‐be‐built‐with‐metals/ 
29）The regularly updated data are available at Carbon Monitor: https://carbonmonitor.org
30）Renewable do of course dirty energy and a lot of metallurgical coal in their manufacture, but we 
do not address those issues here. On the coal data for 2020, see “Global coal production will grow 
this year despite covid‐19 ,” Mining.com, April 9 , 2020 : https://www.mining.com/global‐coal‐pro 
duction‐to‐grow‐by‐ 0 ‐ 5 ‐in‐2020/ 
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building offshore wind capacity is well over ten times more copper‐intensive than natural 
gas‐ and coal‐fired fossil fuel plant. The figure summarizes the kilogrammes of copper, lithi-
um, nickel, and other CRMs required to build a megawatt （MW） of generation capacity for 
the different technologies. It shows that building a MW of intermittent wind and solar gener-
ating capacity requires many more multiples of CRMs than a MW of gas and coal plant. The 
expression of CRM‐intensity is kgs/MW.　31）
Figure 1  actually understates the CRM‐intensity of solar and wind. Wind and solar 
are intermittent, and produce only a fraction of their rated capacity, giving the installed plant 
a comparatively lower efficiency in using CRMs. So in actual generated power output ‐ or 
megawatt‐hours （MWh） of electricity ‐ solar and wind have an even greater CRM‐intensity 
than other technologies. We see this in figure 2 , which displays one of the leading assess- 
31）See “Minerals used in selected power generation technologies,” International Energy Agency, 
May 6 , 2020 : https://www.iea.org/data‐and‐statistics/charts/minerals‐used‐in‐selected‐power‐
generation‐technologies
　 Source: IEA, 2020 31）
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　32）
ments 33） of the total density of copper per kWh of power generated across a variety of tech-
nologies.
The research shows that wind has the highest density of copper for installed capacity 
but that solar has the highest density in actual use. The reason is that, with solar, 
“utilization is significantly lower than that of wind applications due to the fact that solar 
PVs’ hours of generation are roughly limited to 3  hours either side of midday — i.e. 6  
hours per 24, whereas wind farms could in theory run 24/ 7  depending on wind strength. 
The result is that on a g/kWh basis, copper intensity for solar PVs come in higher than 
that of wind technologies, but on an installed capacity basis （MW）， copper intensity for 
wind （both onshore and offshore） applications come in higher.” 34）
As for mobility, figure 3  shows us that the same IEA publication reveals electric ve-
hicles require roughly five times as much CRMs as a conventional car. Similar to power gen-
32）See “Is there Enough Copper for the Green Wave,” Jefferies Equity Research, November 23 , 
2020.
33）Branco W. Schipper, et al., “Estimating global copper demand until 2100 with regression and 
stock dynamics,” Resources, Conservation and Recycling, Vol.132, May 2018: https://www.sciencedi 
rect.com/science/article/pii/S0921344918300041!
34）See p. 27 “Is there Enough Copper for the Green Wave,” Jefferies Equity Research, November 23, 
2020.
Source: Jefferies, 2020 32）
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eration via wind and solar, electric mobility has profound implications for required volumes 
of CRMs. Some of the best work on this has been done by Dutch researchers at Metabolic, 
Copper 8 , and other cutting‐edge consultancies. Their collaborative work is supported by 
the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management in addition to other stakehold-
ers. Their analyses of the CRM implications of 30% EV by 2030 in the Netherlands, the EU, 
and the world warn that even with advanced battery chemistries, demand for cobalt, lithium 
and select rate earths outstrips global supply.35） 36）
Another driver of growing concern over CRMs supply is dangerous uncertainty. 
Though CRM lists are being compiled and updated, the policy environment is opaque, the 
knowledge base concerning CRMs mining and processing is poor, and there are wildly opti-
mistic assumptions regarding substitutability and recycling.
35）See for example Bosch, Sybren, et al. （2018）． “Metal Demand for Electric Vehicles” Metabolic: 
https://www.metabolic.nl/publications/metal‐demand‐for‐electric‐vehicles/ 
36）See “Minerals used in selected power generation technologies,” International Energy Agency, 
May 6 , 2020 : https://www.iea.org/data‐and‐statistics/charts/minerals‐used‐in‐selected‐power‐
generation‐technologies
　 Source: IEA, 2020 36）
Figure 3 　 Minerals used in selected transport technologies
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We have already seen that decarbonization policies and projects are rapidly increas-
ing, driving CRM demand well beyond sustainability. Concerning knowledge erosion and re-
cycling, on December 10 , 2020 , the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies （HCSS） released a 
very detailed, book‐length report on “Securing Critical Materials for Critical Sectors: Policy 
options for the Netherlands and the European Union.” 37） The HCSS analysis first examined 
the CRM implications of the Dutch and EU commitments to decarbonization. Their broad‐
based analysis included CRM demand for renewable energy （wind, solar, geothermal）， ener-
gy grid infrastructure, carbon‐capture and storage, electric vehicles, and semiconductors. 
The HCSS warn that recycling and other “circular economy” policies are quite inadequate to 
address the massive increase in required CRM volumes implied by decarbonization. One can-
not recycle CRMs that are being dug up and processed for use in a massive rollout of VRE, 
EVs, and other systems that will be in use for one or a few decades. One can perhaps reduce 
CRM demand by many informed and strategic choices about where to use them （eg, materi-
ally‐efficient public transit vs EVs）， but that kind of thinking is not in evidence. Even the lit-
erature on “smart cities,” which are ipso facto a locus of CRM demand, does not address the 
CRM implications of smart grids, advanced communications, data centres, and other core 
technologies.38） Thus the HCSS report highlights the current magical thinking about CRM 
supply chains, not simply among policymakers but also industry participants, academics, and 
other stakeholders. The HCSS authors depict it as “knowledge erosion” and their arguments 
merit quotation in detail:
“Market actors are responsible for ensuring resilient supply chains for themselves, 
while the role of the government has been marginalized. A lack of long‐term strategic di-
rection and a phenomenon of knowledge erosion have resulted from reduced government 
involvement...
The phenomenon of knowledge erosion did not occur solely on the governmental 
level, but also on the industrial and academic levels. Due to heavy reliance on global value 
chains for imports of materials, intermediate and end products, the EU and the 
37）See “Securing Critical Materials for Critical Sectors: Policy options for the Netherlands and the 
European Union,” Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, December 10, 2020: https://hcss.nl/report/se 
curing‐critical‐raw‐materials 
38）This issue is lamented by Martin David and Florian Koch, “Smart Is Not Smart Enough!” Antici-
pating Critical Raw Material Use in Smart City Concepts: The Example of Smart Grids,” Sustain-
ability, Vol. 11, August 2019: https://ideas.repec.org/a/gam/jsusta/v11y2019i16p4422‐d258109.html
Decarbonization and Critical Raw Materials: Some Issues for Japan 11
Netherlands currently lack the industrial knowledge and facilities to become self‐sufficient. 
There is a lack of academic and professional focus on developing industrial expertise for 
mining, refining and other supply chain stages.”
One consequence of “knowledge erosion” is that CRM‐intensive “green recovery” de-
carbonization scenarios unfold in a blissful state of logistical ignorance. Few scenarios pay 
any heed to CRM‐intensity, let alone the fact that scaling up any CRM mining and process-
ing requires many years and a lot of money. And note, for example, that current copper proj-
ects are 33% smaller than the average project was in 2012; and these new projects are being 
undertaken by smaller firms with less experience.39） On top of these issues, the depletion of 
existing copper mining projects is striking. One recent assessment indicates that “without 
new capital investments...global copper mined production will drop from the current 20 mil-
lion tonnes [Mt] to below 12Mt by 2034, leading to a supply shortfall of more than 15Mt. Over 
200 copper mines are expected to run out of ore before 2035, with not enough new mines in 
the pipeline to take their place.”40） In tandem, experts on the realities of lithium mining warn 
that battery‐maker and other firms’ current planning for 2023 implies seven times more de-
mand than any conceivable scenario for global supply.41）
Another driver of concern over CRMs is the implications of these trends for human 
rights. Supply constraints are likely to increase the pressure to relax worker and environ-
mental safeguards in order to maximize extraction from existing mines. The Industriall 
Global Union ‐ representing 50 million workers in 140 countries ‐ warned about these chal-
lenges in a November 20, 2020 report. They examined the global battery supply chain’s reli-
ance on copper, cobalt, nickel and lithium, together with the implied acceleration of electric 
vehicle sales. Their expert consultation cautioned that:
“[t]he demand for critical raw materials for the low carbon energy transition batter-
39）On these data, see the summary of comments by Saad Rahim, Chief Economist and Global Head 
of Research, Trafigura, in “JEF U: Commodity Market Perspectives from Trafigura’s Chief Econo-
mist,” Jefferies University, December 16, 2020.
40）Rick Mills, “Copper, the most critical metal,” Mining.com, December 6 , 2020: https://www.min 
ing.com/web/copper‐the‐most‐critical‐metal/ 
41）See Zachary Shahan, “Voodoo Economics & Lithium — Lithium Supply = 15% of 2023 Global EV 
Sales Target,” Clean Technica, September 7 , 2020: https://cleantechnica.com/2020/09/07/voodoo‐
economics‐lithium‐lithium‐supply‐15‐of‐2023‐global‐ev‐sales‐target/ 
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ies, cobalt, lithium, copper and nickel, etc. will likely follow the same upstream demand 
side （mining） narrative of human rights’ violations and unacceptable environmental conse-
quences: child labour, destruction of the living environment of indigenous peoples, ecologi-
cal destruction, water shortage etc.”42）
One of the experts Industriall Global Union consulted with was Andy Leyland, head of 
Supply Chain Strategy at Benchmark Mineral Intelligence. Leyland noted that battery mak-
ers and electric vehicle manufacturers are pressing for cost reductions, at all points of the 
supply chain, including mining. For this reason, he warned that working conditions and other 
factors at existing mines are likely to degrade significantly in a “race to the bottom.” The re-
sult would be worsening environmental injustice at the point of production ‐ i.e., generally 
the global south ‐ while developed‐country “green recovery” scenarios seek to implement 
environmental justice on the home front. 
Prices are also a driver of concern. Benchmark Mineral Intelligence’s Andy Leyland 
forecast that prices for batteries will increase, even though virtually all expectations are for 
declining prices. Nearly every “green recovery” and 100% renewable energy scenario rests 
on the assumption of continued price declines in generation, transmission, storage （including 
batteries） and other aspects of power systems. These scenarios have even increased the call 
on CRMs by simplistic modeling of the economics of scaling “green hydrogen” to 100 GW in 
a decade. They assume that learning‐curve dynamics will drive the price of renewable‐pro-
duced hydrogen below the “blue hydrogen” produced by fossil fuels by 2030 .43） Yet as 
Leyland highlighted above, the patent fact is that “demand for the required raw materials 
will grow faster than new mining capacities can be created.”44） Clearly, some hard, strategic 
choices have to be made on maximizing the efficient use of CRMs, lest the cost of decarbon-
ization be worsened inequality and energy poverty.
The general response to this kind of evidence is to argue for substitution of the supply
‐constrained CRM. But there are limits to that approach. One example of limits is seen in 
the effort to use nickel to reduce reliance on cobalt in electric vehicle batteries. In collabora-
42）See “Developing an global trade union battery supply chain strategy,” Industriall Global Union, 
November 20 , 2020 : http://www.industriall‐union.org/developing‐a‐global‐trade‐union‐battery‐
supply‐chain‐strategy 
43）On this scenario, see “Making Green Hydrogen a Cost‐Competitive Climate Solution,” Internation-
al Renewable Energy Agency, December 17 , 2020 : https://www.irena.org/newsroom/pressreleas 
es/2020/Dec/Making‐Green‐Hydrogen‐a‐Cost‐Competitive‐Climate‐Solution 
44）Ibid.
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tion with Panasonic, the US automaker Tesla has been at the forefront of this initiative. 
Indeed, Tesla’s goal is to entirely eliminate the role of cobalt in electric‐vehicle （EV） batter-
ies, and it is achieving notable success in this objective. However, the initiative has encoun-
tered something of a “whack a mole” phenomenon. This is because supplies of nickel are in-
creasingly constrained, posing a challenge to large‐scale substitution of cobalt in the high 
energy‐density batteries required for electrified transport. Global demand for nickel in EV 
batteries is projected to increase from 3 % of all sources of demand （such as stainless steel, 
non‐ferrous alloys, and other products） in 2018 to 12% by 2023, as global automakers are ex-
pected to introduce over 200 new EV models. But the volatility of prices for nickel has been 
a drag on investment in increased mining capacity. In consequence, metals analysts warn 
that “[t]here is no new nickel in the pipeline” even as other specialists highlight the time re-
quired to find alternatives.45）
Concerning nickel, the EU released a detailed study （by Roskill, on the EU’s behalf） 
on February 5 , 2021. Figure 4  is taken from the report, which suggests that EVs will be 
the largest driver of nickel demand over the next two decades. Indeed, the figure shows that 
projected nickel use in EV batteries rises exponentially, even assuming that India and other 
countries do little EV deployment. In numerical terms, nickel demand for EVs is projected to 
rise from 920,000 tons in 2020 to 2.6 million tons in 2040. The analysis warns that this EV 
battery demand for nickel from China, the EU and rich “JKT” Asia （Japan, Korea, Taiwan） 
is likely to drive global nickel production into deficit in a few years. Yet nickel is crucial for 
stainless steel （eg, for sanitation systems） and other applications that the world needs for 
sustainable development.46） Therefore, trade‐offs will have to be made lest real human needs 
be made forfeit to imagined needs for personal transport.
45）Rhiannon Hoyle, “Electric‐Car Dreams Could Fall a Nickel Short,” The Wall Street Journal, Sep-
tember 29 , 2029 : https://www.wsj.com/articles/electric‐car‐dreams‐could‐fall‐a‐nickel‐short‐
11569780257 




The EU study on nickel includes a section on “implications for policy,” wherein the ex-
perts suggest the EU add nickel to their CRM list and get a grip on CRM via robust policy 
implementation. One suggestion is a focus on public transport and other approaches that 
dampen battery‐nickel demand. These policies have to be implemented now, because CRM 
mining and processing capacity takes years to build （even ignoring environmental, human 
rights issues）．
But those arguments fly in the face of a public debate transfixed by bold promises 
that ignore CRMs. One example is seen in the case of EV‐maker Tesla, which has promised 
to raise EV production over 40 times in a decade, from 499,550 in 2020 to 20 million by 
2030.48） Table 1  provides a summary of the CRM implications of Tesla’s 2030 target, which 
is merely one of the more outrageous of recent bold commitments by VRE, EV, and other 
stakeholders. The table is taken from a January 27 , 2021 Mining.com analysis, that drilled 
down into the battery chemistries and other details and then assessed CRM demand to meet 
Tesla’s commitment. To put the numbers in perspective, the table includes 2019 mine pro-
duction data （before COVID‐19 disruption to supply chains） for nickel along with graphite 
47）Jake Fraser, et al., “Study on future demand and supply security of nickel for electric vehicle bat-
teries,” Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2021 : https://publications.jrc.
ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC123439/roskill‐jrc_classi_ni_market_study_identifiers_final.
pdf
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   Source: European Commission, 2021 47）
Figure 4 　 Nickel consumed in automotive batteries by region 2020‐2040 （t Ni）
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and other CRMs. 　49）
As is evident from the table, and as the article highlights, “[w]hen Tesla makes 20 mil-
lion cars in a year it will need more than 30% of global mined nickel production in 2019 （2020 
saw a 20%‐plus reduction in output） for its batteries. Put another way Tesla will have to 
buy the entire output of the top 6  producers – Norilsk Vale Jinchuan Sumitomo Glencore 
BHP and then some. Or build the equivalent of 23 mines like Sumitomo’s Ambatovy mine in 
Madagascar – at $8.5 billion a pop.” Tesla would also require an astounding 94% of the 
world’s production of natural graphite, and 39% of  magnet rare earth mined output （in the 
table “MagREO （NdPr, Dy, Tb）”）． Since those CRM are also needed for almost equally am-
bitious VRE, green hydrogen, and related commitments ‐ not to mention more mundane 
needs in high‐tech health care, communications, education, and the like ‐ huge compromises 
will have to be made. As the Dutch Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations 
（SOMO） warns in a December 2020 study of batteries, “any energy transition strategy 
should prioritise reducing demand for batteries and cars, thereby reducing mineral and ener-
gy use in absolute terms. Strategies proposed include ride‐sharing, car‐sharing and smaller 
vehicles. Combined, these approaches have the biggest potential to reduce the negative im-
49）Frik Els, “All the mines Tesla needs to build 20 million cars a year,” Mining.com, January 27 , 
2021: https://www.mining.com/all‐the‐mines‐tesla‐needs‐to‐build‐20‐million‐cars‐a‐year/
Table 1 　 Metals Tesla needs to build 20 million cars per year,  
and CRM share of total global production in 2019
Tesla Production @ 20m Material Required （t） Production 2019 （t） % of Production
Graphite 1,028,775 1,100,000 94%
Nickel 750,410 2,460,000 31%
Lithium 127,302 77,000 165%
Copper （vehicle） 1,820,000 21,000,000 9%
Manganese 20,811 19,000,000 +0%
Cobalt 68,315 122,000 56%
Aluminum （battery） 16,544 64,000,000 +0%
Aluminum （vehicle） 3,380,000 64,000,000 5%
MagREO （NdPr, Dy, Tb） 18,000 46,000 39%
Battery graphite, nickel, cobalt, lithium, manganese, MagREO （NdPr, Dy, Tb） : Adamas Intelligence
Production: USGS, BMO, Morgan Stanley, BP. Fitch, Excl. synthetic graphite
Copper, aluminum （vehicle） : UBS estimates of Chevy Volt
Source: Frik Els, 2021 49）
立教経済学研究　第74巻　第 4 号　2021年16
pacts of road mobility.” 50）
But the global debate is not focused on making compromises in order to maximize the 
spatial efficiency and functional efficiency of CRM use. Hence our precarious present, where 
green‐energy scenarios of “overbuild” 51） and “electrify everything” assume a cornucopia of 
copper and other CRMs, even as bemused CRM analysts show that the cornucopia does not 
exist. The present is not intellectually sustainable, and we should not expect the geologic and 
other facts of CRMs to yield. Thus, it is indeed timely that the IEA undertake a global study 
of CRM.
Japan’s supply‐chain vulnerabilities
A more long‐term set of issues for Japan, in particular, are supply‐chain vulnerabili-
ties. Just as Japan has virtually no fossil‐fuel resources, it does not have significant terrestri-
al endowments of CRM. The country has had strong trade ties but, at times, a rocky political 
relationship with neighboring China. Over the last decade, Japan has somewhat diversified 
its rare earths supply, wary of China’s demonstrated capacity to restrict exports. Even so, 
58% of Japan’s rare earth imports came from China in 2018 , according to the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies “China Power” project. As figure 5  shows, the Center’s 
data reveal a persistent reliance on China for rare earth imports among all the major devel-
oped economies, and not just Japan. 
And as we see in Figure 6 , a 2020 report from the Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National 
Corporation （JOGMEC） warns that China enjoys a continued monopoly in the separation and 
purification of rare earths. The figure shows the degree of Chinese dominance at various 
stages of the supply chain, from mining through to manufacturing. The figure shows that 
even some rare earth mining takes place in the US and Australia, nearly all separation and 
purification is done in China. One reason is that China’s willingness to bear the enormous en-
vironmental damage from mining and purifying rare earths allows it to weaken the invest-
ment incentives of would‐be competitors.
50）See “Electric vehicle boom taking heavy social and environmental toll,” SOMO, December 22 , 
2020: https://www.somo.nl/electric‐vehicle‐boom‐taking‐heavy‐social‐and‐environmental‐toll/
51）On overbuild scenarios, see Michael J. Coren, “It’s time to start wasting solar energy,” Quartz, 
December 30, 2020: https://qz.com/1950381/the‐case‐for‐producing‐way‐more‐solar‐energy‐than
‐we‐need/
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　52）　53）
52）The figure is from “Does China Pose a Threat to Global Rare Earth Supply Chains?,” China Pow-
er. July 17, 2020: https://chinapower.csis.org/china‐rare‐earths/ 
53）See （in Japanese） “Final report on research concerning the state of rare earth supply chains in 
North America,” Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation, February 28, 2020: http://mric.jog 
mec.go.jp/wp‐content/uploads/2020/05/ree_supply_northamerica20200228.pdf
　　　　 Source: China Power, 2020 52）
Figure 5 　 Reliance on rare earth imports from China, 2008‐18
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Source: JOGMEC, 2020 53）
Figure 6 　 Risks in the rare earths supply chain
Risk of the REE Supply Chain































It is quite concerning for Japan that China dominates the mining and processing of ra-
re earths and many other CRMs. Last month, Japan’s Ministry of the Economy, Trade and 
Industry （METI） stated in its vision for the domestic offshore wind industry that Japan 
must aim to produce at least 60% of components locally in order to cut costs.54） Under busi-
ness as usual, the viability of this goal depends heavily on China’s interest in continuing to 
export a large share of its CRMs to Japanese manufacturers. Japan is perhaps uniquely ex-
posed because it has scarce resource endowments in tandem with fraught relations with 
China. Increased access to rare earths is imperative for building a high‐tech and decarboniz-
ing domestic economy and exports, yet China is a strategic competitor rather than partner.
Yet China is increasingly using its own rare earth and other CRM, in domestic deploy-
ments of solar, wind, electric cars, 5G communications, and other devices. And as Chinese 
scholars now warn, given increasing demand and competing uses there simply may not be 
enough for China to continue satisfying the bulk of Japanese and other international de-
mand.55） 
The ESG imperative
The coal‐fired power and lax environmental regulations that have helped make China 
a formidable player in CRMs, and by extension a major factor affecting Japan’s manufactur-
ing and energy strategies, may soon work against it. Extracting and processing rare earths 
and other CRMs is very energy‐intensive, with massive carbon footprints when undertaken 
in locales dependent on fossil‐fuels, as China still is. Certainly, China is seeking to strengthen 
environmental rules relating to rare earths and other CRMs.56） But its big handicap may be 
energy, as the most recent data from the IEA show that China’s power mix in November 
2020 was 66% coal and rising.57）
54）See p. 61 in （in Japanese） “A Green Growth Strategy with Carbon Neutrality by 2050 ,” Japan 
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, December 25 , 2020 : https://www.meti.go.jp/pre
ss/2020/12/20201225012/20201225012‐ 2 .pdf 
55）See Jiashuo Li, et al., “Critical Rare‐Earth Elements Mismatch Global Wind‐Power Ambitions,” 
One Earth 3 , July 24, 2020: https://www.cell.com/one‐earth/pdf/S2590‐3322（20）30298‐ 0 .pdf 
56）On these developments, see Leslie Liang, “Rare earths: China’s new rare earth regulations strive 
for better industry management,” Roskill Industry News, January 18 , 2021 : https://roskill.com/
news/rare‐earths‐chinas‐new‐rare‐earth‐regulations‐strive‐for‐better‐industry‐management/ 
57）See “Electricity mix in China, January‐November 2020 ,” International Energy Agency, January 
15 , 2021 : https://www.iea.org/data‐and‐statistics/charts/electricity‐mix‐in‐china‐january‐novem 
ber‐2020
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China’s very GHG‐intensive energy is an issue because of the striking rise in promi-
nence of environmental, social and governance （ESG） rules. These rules are now forcing 
firms to forego the business‐as‐usual approach in securing CRMs, obligating them to accept 
responsibility for the lifecycle environmental cost of products. These rules are expanding 
among governments （especially the EU）， global finance agencies （such as the Financial 
Stability Board）， and investor services. ESG rules are thus becoming of increasing concern 
to miners. For example, figure 7  displays the results of a White & Case survey of 68 high‐
level stakeholders in metals and mining （not just CRM）， released January 13, 2021. The sur-
vey shows that ESG is by far the top issue, at 45.4% versus 13.6% for COVID‐19 supply‐
chain risks.　58）
As with any other business sector, the extension of ESG rules into the CRMs involves 
three areas, or “scopes,” that apply to the firms producing them. First are scope 1  direct 
GHG emissions from the firm’s in‐house fuel combustion and the like. Scope 2  include GHG 
emissions from the firm’s use of electricity and heat generated elsewhere. And scope 3  
emissions are the indirect, value‐chain emissions that are beyond the firm’s control but gen-
erally susceptible to its influence. Figure 8  portrays these 3  scopes in some detail, provid- 
58）Rebecca Campbell, et al., “Mining & Metals 2021: ESG momentum reaching a crescendo in a resil-
ient market,” White & Case, January 13 , 2021 : https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/
mining‐metals‐2021‐esg‐momentum‐reaching‐crescendo‐resilient‐market
Source: White & Case, 2021 58）






















59）See “Corporate Value Chain （Scope 3 ） Accounting and Reporting Standard,” Greenhouse Gas 
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ing examples of how they relate to the reporting firm per se, in addition to its upstream and 
downstream activities. Of particular importance concerning CRMs is that their GHG‐intensi-
ty is increasingly not simply an issue for the mining and processing firms. Rather, the firms 
that use refined CRMs in building wind turbines, electric vehicles, and other devices also 
have to assess those materials’ ESG implications.
It would be wrong to assume that these ESG and other rules mean little in practice. 
ESG rules are becoming one of the primary mechanisms countries are using to build strate-
gic autonomy and resilience. The EU experts have already undertaken detailed comparative 
assessments of the carbon footprints of CRMs made in China versus those produced in 
Europe.  Figure 9  provides a summary of the details for the CRMs aluminum, nickel, silicon 
and zinc. The data indicate that a given weight of Chinese‐made aluminum was 2.8 times as 
carbon‐intensive as its EU‐made equivalent. For nickel, the difference was even greater, at 
8  times. Similar China‐EU gaps are evident for the silicon needed in solar, semiconductors, 
and other applications; the zinc used in galvanizing steel, batteries; and other areas pertinent 
to decarbonization.　60）
Indeed, the EU “taxonomy” of sustainability rules applied to its Critical Raw Material 
Action Plan is very strict. The carbon thresholds for aluminum （one of the EU CRMs） is so 
60）See Tomas Wyns and Gauri Khandekar, “Metals for a Climate Neutral Europe: A 2050 Blueprint,” 
Institute for European Studies, 2019 :  https://www.ies.be/files/Metals_for_a_Climate_Neutral_
Europe.pdf
Sources: European Aluminium, The Nickel Institute, AlloyConsult, Congcong Qi, et al., 2017 
Source: Institute for European Studies, 2019 60）














restrictive that “[o]nly producers with access to massive volumes of nuclear or hydropower 
can meet such a requirement.” 61） Chinese aluminum, produced via its coal‐based power grid, 
would certainly not make the cut.
The upshot of these rules is that a Japanese manufacturer of, say, wind power equip-
ment will need to factor in the additional “cost” of the environmental impacts of CRMs they 
import. Put simply, in the choice between a bar of metal produced with clean energy and an-
other with dirty energy, the former will become more attractive. This is a major reason one 
sees Finnish nickel sulphate producer Terrafame arguing that a kilogram of its nickel sul-
phate leads to 1.75 kg CO2 ‐eq （carbon‐dioxide equivalent of all GHGs released） verus the 
industry average of 5.4 kg.62） At the very least, the cost of the metal will be assessed in 
terms of both production costs and ESG impacts. The resulting all‐in cost may in time also 
include an emissions tax and similar measures. 63）
But these extra costs present a serious challenge for Japan. Figures 10 and 11 are tak-
en from the EU study prepared by Roskill and released on February 5 , 2021. Japan already 
does include nickel as CRM, and the Roskill numbers suggest how vulnerable it is in the face 
of “seismic” demand drivers. Figure 10 shows that Japan’s electricity cost to process nickel 
sulphate into useable materials is higher than the global average in addition to neighbouring 
competition in South Korea, Taiwan, and China. Japan’s natural gas costs, for producing nick-
el sulphate, are assessed at roughly the global average. But the country is disadvantaged 
through a lack of international pipelines and other infrastructure to use demand to reduce 
costs.
And figure 11 reveals that Japan is also disadvantaged by high labour costs for its do-
mestic refining capacity. These facts underscore Japan’s difficulties in responding to the chal-
lenge from emerging competitors. Without an integrated and intelligent national strategy, 
Japan may lost a great deal of business.
61）See Anna‐Michelle Asimakopoulou, “The EU Taxonomy: a means to an end that risks being the 
end of many industries,” EURACTIV, January 20, 2021: https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy‐
environment/opinion/eu‐taxonomy‐for‐sustainable‐activities‐a‐means‐to‐an‐end‐that‐risks‐being
‐the‐end‐of‐many‐european‐industries/1556327/ 
62）See “Terrafame’s Nickel Sulphate Production Offers the Lowest Carbon Footprint in the Industry 
– Altogether 60% Lower than in Existing Conventional Processes,” September 18 , 2020 : https://
www.terrafame.com/media/terrafame‐ltd‐carbon‐footprint.pdf
63）A discussion of these ESG‐related tax and other measures can be found in the “OECD Business 
and Finance Outlook 2020 : Sustainable and Resilient Finance,” OECD, 2020 : https://www.oecd‐ili 
brary.org/sites/bebb 0 add‐en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/bebb 0 add‐en 
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　64）
　65）
Japan’s specialist debate should be animated by these concerns. One reason is that 
this new trajectory of competition and price‐discovery is already emerging in conventional 
energy fields, such as LNG. Producers are being encouraged to offer carbon offsets as part of 
64）Jake Fraser, et al., “Study on future demand and supply security of nickel for electric vehicle bat-
teries,” Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2021 : https://publications.jrc.
ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC123439/roskill‐jrc_classi_ni_market_study_identifiers_final.
pdf
65）Jake Fraser, et al., “Study on future demand and supply security of nickel for electric vehicle bat-




（ 1 ）Weighted average based on nickel sulphate production in 2019
Source: European Commission, 2021 64）
Figure 10　 Comparison of industrial electricity and natural gas costs within key nickel sulphate 
producing countries and provinces in 2019 Global average=100
Source:Roskill, 2020.
（ 1 ）Weighted average based on nickel sulphate production in 2019
Source: European Commission, 2021 65）
Figure 11　 Comparison of labour costs within key nickel sulphate producing countries and provinces 
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the sale, anticipating compulsory rules. That is, businesses are anticipating stricter formal 
rules by bringing in measures that help reduce the overall LNG supply chain.66）
And as we have seen above, these trends are already emerging in the CRM space – 
not in spite of, but because of the strategic importance of these materials. As US mining fi-
nancier Robert Friedland put it in the January 18 meeting of the Association of Mineral 
Exploration annual conference, “There will be no one price for copper, there will be no more 
one price for gold... Everything will be priced in relation to its ESG components.” 67）
Whither Japan ?
As it stands, Japan’s laudable zero‐carbon ambitions effectively commit it to a massive 
increase in imported CRMs, even in the short run. Targets for 2050 matter far less than the 
fact that virtually all the major economies are implementing CRM‐intensive green recovery 
projects. Japan’s green initiatives have this larger context. As we have seen, wind power and 
electric vehicles requires many multiples of CRM than the many gigawatts of conventional 
power and millions of vehicles they are to displace in a decade or so. 
One would think resource‐poor Japan would be leading the world on means to maxi-
mize CRM‐efficiency and engagement with ESGs. But Japan has a weak mining industry and 
consequently poor public and specialist debate on CRMs. To date, resource‐poor Japan has 
emphasized CRM recycling and substitution. But as the IEA and other studies show, those 
strategies are buckshot rather than silver‐bullet solutions. And over the next several years, 
Japan will have to secure much larger volumes of CRMs in the midst of increasing resource 
nationalism, worsening ore‐grades, and other complications. At the same time, life‐cycle 
emission commitments will push Japan to be choosy: if it fails to procure ESG‐conforming 
“green CRMs” rather than the environmentally costly “gray CRMs” it currently sources, it 
will risk forfeiting business in the midst of history’s biggest energy revolution. And Japan 
will have to find some way to control its energy and labour costs, even as VRE and EV ma-
terial inputs prices likely rise. Yet so far, Japan’s domestic resource and energy‐environmen-
66）For a detailed discussion and examples, see “Decarbonization of the LNG supply chain: challenges 
and the way forward,” Herbert, Smith, Freehills Legal Briefing, January 14 , 2021 : https://www. 
herbertsmithfreehills.com/latest‐thinking/decarbonisation‐of‐the‐lng‐supply‐chain‐challenges‐and
‐the‐way‐forward
67）See the quotations in Nicholas Bennett, “Revenge of the miners,” Business in Vancouver, January 
18, 2021: https://biv.com/article/2021/01/revenge‐miners
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tal policy debates have yet to grapple with the dilemmas. We have seen that Japan has a list 
of CRMs, but its policymaking has yet to link them to ESGs. The METI is yet to produce da-
ta on the CRM‐intensity of, for example, the gigawatts of offshore wind and millions of 
tonnes of green hydrogen being bandied about.68） And Japan’s business media, green‐energy 
advocates, and other stakeholders pay virtually no attention to the enormity of CRM chal-
lenges in tandem with ESGs. As of this writing, the focus is on the comparative costs of nu-
clear and VRE, with the reigning assumption being that prices will fall.
Japan’s attention deficit and knowledge erosion in regard to CRM are quite startling 
for a resource‐poor country. At the same time, Japan has a significant opportunity. For one 
thing, its exposure to CRM supply uncertainties give it ample incentives to act. It also has a 
lot of capital to invest in solutions. Moreover, its policymakers are debating the strategic en-
ergy plan, with the prospect of revising it in the summer of 2021. And Japan’s purchasing 
power affords it significant capacity to lead on CRMs ‐ to be a rule maker rather than a rule 
taker. This may happen, as Japanese industry stakeholders at the core of Japan’s decarbon-
ization industrial strategy are increasingly （and quite legitimately） concerned that rules 
“stipulated, regulated and decided by the EU will become the global standard.” 69） The IEA’s 
announcement of its critical mineral initiative has been followed by a flurry of high‐level in-
ternational governance changes and collaborative deliberations. Perhaps Japan’s comparative 
complacency on CRMs and ESGs will undergo rapid change during 2021.
68）“Green hydrogen” implies a lot of CRM invest in wind and solar for power inputs plus to platinum 
and other materials for electrolizers. David Fickling, “Hydrogen is a trillion dollar bet on the future,” 
Bloomberg News, December 2 , 2020 : https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2020‐opinion‐hydro 
gen‐green‐energy‐revolution‐challenges‐risks‐advantages/index.html
69）This concern was expressed on December 6 , 2020 to the Financial Times by Suntory chief ex-
ecutive Niinami Takeshi. Niinami is one of two private‐sector advisors on Japan’s Council on Eco-
nomic and Fiscal Policy, which is chaired by the prime minister and oversees integrated green‐
growth and industrial policy. See Niinami’s comments in Robin Harding, et al., “Japan warns against 
allowing EU to set emission rules,” Financial Times, December 6 , 2020 : https://www.ft.com/
content/13d09498‐54e 5 ‐4886‐9626‐ 8 a259529146b
